Content Moderation Policies Across Competing Roots

As decentralized naming systems mature and proliferate, the issue of content moderation has become increasingly urgent and complex. Competing root namespaces like Ethereum Name Service (ENS), Unstoppable Domains, Handshake, and others each operate with their own policies, governance models, and philosophical orientations toward censorship, speech, and platform responsibility. Unlike the traditional DNS system managed by ICANN, which operates under a relatively centralized and uniform policy framework, these blockchain-based naming systems are fragmented and ideologically diverse. This fragmentation introduces a multifaceted challenge: how to address harmful or illegal content, impersonation, and abuse in an ecosystem where the domain infrastructure is often immutable, uncensorable, and globally distributed.

At the core of the debate is the question of whether content moderation should even be possible at the root level in a decentralized naming system. ENS, for example, operates entirely on Ethereum and relies on smart contracts to manage domain ownership, resolution records, and governance functions. The core ENS contracts are not upgradeable without the approval of its DAO, which is governed by ENS token holders. This design reflects a deep commitment to decentralization, but it also means that ENS has limited capacity to unilaterally remove or suspend domain names—even in cases of clear abuse or malicious activity. The DAO could, in theory, vote to revoke or blacklist specific domains, but doing so would require community consensus and likely provoke controversy over the balance between censorship resistance and social accountability.

In contrast, Unstoppable Domains takes a more centralized approach, especially in its early architecture. The platform has reserved thousands of high-profile brand names and prevents their registration without verification. Additionally, it has demonstrated a willingness to respond to trademark disputes and other legal challenges by blocking or disabling certain domains, particularly those involving impersonation or criminal content. While Unstoppable Domains also uses blockchain technology and issues NFTs to represent domain ownership, the resolution layer and management systems have historically included off-chain components, enabling more responsive content control. This model provides greater protection for brands and users but introduces centralization risks, trust dependencies, and questions about who sets moderation standards in a supposedly decentralized ecosystem.

Handshake, which aims to decentralize the root zone of the internet, takes an even more minimal stance on content moderation. In the Handshake model, users bid on and register top-level domains (TLDs) through an on-chain auction system, and the winning bidder becomes the sole owner of that TLD. The protocol does not impose any restrictions on what names can be registered or how they are used. Content served under Handshake domains is entirely the responsibility of the domain owner, and there is no central authority capable of enforcing moderation. This approach maximizes sovereignty and censorship resistance but provides no native mechanisms for handling abuse, making it difficult for users or regulators to address harmful behavior short of legal enforcement against individual domain holders.

The divergence in moderation policies across these systems reflects deeper philosophical divides about the role of infrastructure in regulating speech. For some in the Web3 space, the idea of immutable, uncensorable names is a foundational principle—a bulwark against authoritarianism, deplatforming, and centralized control. For others, it is a vulnerability that exposes users to scams, hate speech, or illicit content with few options for recourse. These tensions are compounded by the global nature of blockchain networks, where jurisdictions differ widely on what constitutes illegal or harmful content. A domain serving politically sensitive material might be protected in one country but criminalized in another, and decentralized naming systems offer no easy way to reconcile such legal conflicts.

Further complicating the issue is the content resolution layer. While a blockchain domain like alice.eth may be immutable, the website it points to is often hosted on decentralized storage systems like IPFS or Arweave. These systems also claim to be censorship-resistant, but they are often accessed via HTTP gateways controlled by centralized providers. In practice, many moderation efforts focus on these gateways, which can block access to specific content hashes even if the data remains available through other peers. ENS domains that point to abusive content on IPFS might be functionally suppressed by disabling resolution through popular gateways like ipfs.io, eth.link, or eth.limo. This introduces a patchwork of moderation practices that depend not on the domain system itself but on the access points users rely on.

Efforts to standardize or coordinate moderation policies across competing roots have been minimal, in part because the systems serve different constituencies and operate with varying degrees of decentralization. There is no equivalent of ICANN’s Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) in the Web3 space, and attempts to create decentralized arbitration or naming courts—such as Kleros—remain experimental. Without common dispute resolution mechanisms, trademark holders, regulators, and civil society groups are forced to address conflicts on a platform-by-platform basis, often with limited success or transparency.

Looking ahead, moderation in decentralized naming may evolve along multiple paths. One possibility is the emergence of voluntary reputation layers or registries that index and flag domain names according to community-driven standards. Wallets, browsers, and dApps could subscribe to these registries to provide users with warnings or filter access to known malicious or offensive names. Another avenue involves more sophisticated governance structures within naming DAOs, where token holders could delegate moderation responsibilities to elected committees or establish criteria for revocation or dispute resolution. However, these approaches risk reintroducing hierarchy and bias into systems that were designed to be neutral and permissionless.

Ultimately, the future of content moderation across Web3 roots will depend on a combination of protocol design, community norms, legal developments, and technical innovations. The challenge is not only to prevent harm but to do so without undermining the foundational values of decentralization, user control, and free expression. The question is not whether moderation will happen—it already does, in fragmented and inconsistent ways—but whether it can be made transparent, accountable, and fair in systems that were not built with central control in mind. As naming protocols continue to evolve and intersect with real-world usage, the policies and practices that govern their content will become as important as the technology that powers them.

As decentralized naming systems mature and proliferate, the issue of content moderation has become increasingly urgent and complex. Competing root namespaces like Ethereum Name Service (ENS), Unstoppable Domains, Handshake, and others each operate with their own policies, governance models, and philosophical orientations toward censorship, speech, and platform responsibility. Unlike the traditional DNS system managed by…