Content Regulation vs DNS Governance Where Lines Blur

The Domain Name System, as a core component of internet infrastructure, was designed to serve as a neutral technical system for resolving human-readable domain names into IP addresses. It operates beneath the application and content layers of the internet, translating identifiers like example.com into machine-friendly routing information. However, as global debates over harmful online content, illegal activity, disinformation, and digital rights have intensified, the once-clear boundary between DNS governance and content regulation has increasingly blurred. This shift has profound implications for the institutions that manage TLDs, for registrars and registries, and for the broader question of who controls what can and cannot exist online.

Traditionally, DNS governance has focused on technical coordination, operational security, and policy frameworks for domain name registration and dispute resolution. ICANN, the organization that oversees the DNS at the global level, has maintained a long-standing position that it is not an internet content regulator. Its remit includes managing the allocation of TLDs, ensuring DNS stability, and enforcing contractual compliance for registries and registrars, but not adjudicating the legality or appropriateness of the content hosted on domains. This principle has been central to maintaining the multistakeholder model, which relies on narrowly defined roles for different internet governance institutions.

However, practical and political pressures have challenged this separation. Governments, advocacy groups, and even segments of the private sector have increasingly turned to domain name registrars and registries as potential chokepoints for curbing access to certain types of content. This is because DNS operators are, in many cases, the only centralized entities with the technical ability to suspend or disable a domain, regardless of the content’s hosting provider, geographic location, or legal jurisdiction. As a result, registries and registrars have found themselves caught between their technical function and growing demands to act against domains used for hate speech, piracy, fraud, child sexual abuse material, terrorist propaganda, or politically sensitive topics.

One prominent example of this tension is the case of the Daily Stormer, a neo-Nazi website that was deplatformed by multiple DNS providers in 2017. After the site published an article mocking the death of a protester at a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, both GoDaddy and later Google Domains refused to continue providing registration services. The website then cycled through various registrars and TLDs, some of which also declined service under pressure from civil society and government actors. Although none of these registrars were acting under a formal court order, they justified their actions by referencing terms of service that prohibit abusive or illegal behavior. This case marked a turning point in public awareness of how DNS governance could be used, or perceived to be used, to regulate content indirectly.

Another layer of complexity arises from national laws that seek to extend jurisdiction across borders by compelling DNS operators to take action against domain names. Russia’s Roskomnadzor, China’s CAC, and other state authorities have on several occasions ordered DNS-level blocks of websites deemed to violate national speech or security laws. While these actions are typically enforced at the ISP or DNS resolver level within those countries, they can influence upstream actors—such as TLD registries or ICANN-accredited registrars—when the domain names involved are registered or operated through entities with global reach. In some cases, international human rights organizations have raised concerns about the willingness of DNS intermediaries to comply with politically motivated takedown requests that lack due process or conflict with norms of free expression.

The debate over DNS and content regulation has also reached ICANN’s policy-making structures. For instance, discussions in the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) have increasingly wrestled with questions around DNS abuse—defined broadly as malware, phishing, botnets, and spam—but which often overlaps with concerns about harmful or unwanted content. While ICANN’s contracts with registrars and registries include obligations to address DNS abuse, the scope and definition of abuse have been contentious. Some stakeholders advocate for expanding these provisions to include content-related harms, while others argue that this would transform DNS operators into de facto content moderators, a role they are neither equipped for nor mandated to perform.

Further complicating matters is the role of trusted notifier systems, where law enforcement agencies, intellectual property holders, or civil society groups enter into agreements with registrars or registries to expedite the takedown of domains associated with unlawful or infringing content. These arrangements, while efficient, often operate outside of formal legal procedures and can lack transparency or appeal mechanisms. Critics argue that such systems risk circumventing due process and allow private actors to impose content-based decisions under the guise of DNS policy enforcement.

Technological developments have added another dimension to the blurred lines between content and DNS governance. The rise of DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) and DNS-over-TLS (DoT) encrypts DNS queries to improve user privacy, but also limits the ability of network-level actors to monitor or block DNS requests. This has led to calls from some governments and child protection advocates for alternate approaches to content filtering, including upstream intervention at the domain level. Meanwhile, blockchain-based naming systems like Handshake or Ethereum Name Service promise censorship resistance by operating outside ICANN’s DNS entirely, raising new governance challenges and fragmenting the traditional policy landscape.

In light of these dynamics, registries and registrars are increasingly adopting acceptable use policies and content moderation practices as part of their contractual and operational frameworks. Some have established abuse response teams or external advisory boards to evaluate takedown requests, while others seek to defer action unless compelled by legal orders. Yet there remains little uniformity in how these policies are applied across the ecosystem, leading to uncertainty for registrants and users alike.

ICANN itself remains cautious. While it encourages contracted parties to address DNS abuse, it consistently maintains that content regulation lies outside its mission. This position is reflected in its Bylaws and affirmed in multiple public statements. Nonetheless, as the policy environment evolves and as domain names continue to be used in ways that trigger social and legal concerns, the boundary between managing the technical infrastructure of the internet and regulating its informational content becomes harder to maintain.

Ultimately, the intersection of content regulation and DNS governance raises deep questions about accountability, freedom of expression, and the distribution of power in the digital age. When DNS actors are pressed into roles as content gatekeepers, even informally or temporarily, it transforms the expectations placed upon them and redefines the purpose of infrastructure policy. Addressing this tension requires a renewed commitment to transparency, clear delineation of responsibilities, and the development of principled frameworks that protect both the resilience of the internet and the rights of its users. As global norms around speech and regulation continue to diverge, maintaining the neutrality of the DNS while acknowledging its impact on content access will be one of the defining challenges of internet governance in the years to come.

The Domain Name System, as a core component of internet infrastructure, was designed to serve as a neutral technical system for resolving human-readable domain names into IP addresses. It operates beneath the application and content layers of the internet, translating identifiers like example.com into machine-friendly routing information. However, as global debates over harmful online content,…