Liability and Disclosure Best Practices Involving Registrar Data Breaches
- by Staff
As gatekeepers of domain name ownership, registrars play a crucial role in the security and stability of the internet. These entities are entrusted with sensitive customer data, including domain ownership records, payment information, account credentials, and DNS settings that underpin the operational integrity of websites. A compromise at the registrar level does not just expose private data—it can enable domain hijacking, malware deployment, phishing operations, and widescale service disruption. Despite this critical responsibility, data breaches at registrars have occurred with alarming regularity, highlighting systemic shortcomings in cybersecurity practices, regulatory oversight, and post-breach transparency. Understanding the liability landscape and establishing robust disclosure protocols is no longer optional—it is fundamental to maintaining trust in the global domain name system.
High-profile breaches in the domain industry have demonstrated the devastating consequences of lax security. In 2020, Web.com and its subsidiaries, Network Solutions and Register.com, suffered a breach that exposed account details for millions of customers, including contact information, domain ownership records, and in some cases, access to DNS settings. In 2021, GoDaddy—the world’s largest domain registrar—disclosed a breach that affected over 1.2 million customers of its WordPress hosting service, exposing SSL keys and database credentials. A follow-up breach in 2023 further shook the industry, when threat actors gained access to internal systems and customer support tools, potentially impacting domain management controls. These incidents underscore the elevated threat landscape facing registrars and raise urgent questions about how well-prepared these organizations are to detect, mitigate, and disclose such attacks.
Legally, the liability of registrars in the wake of data breaches is determined by a complex interplay of contract law, data protection regulations, and, increasingly, international norms such as the GDPR in the European Union or CCPA in California. Most registrars limit their liability in their terms of service, disclaiming responsibility for damages arising from security incidents unless gross negligence can be proven. However, these disclaimers are not always enforceable, particularly if the registrar failed to implement reasonable security measures or ignored industry best practices. In jurisdictions with strong data protection laws, registrars are considered data controllers or processors, depending on the context, and must ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of personal data. Failure to do so can result in regulatory fines, civil lawsuits, and reputational damage.
The General Data Protection Regulation imposes particularly stringent requirements. Under Article 33 of the GDPR, data controllers must notify supervisory authorities of a breach within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, unless the breach is unlikely to result in risk to data subjects. If there is a high risk, data subjects must also be notified without undue delay. The CCPA requires similar notifications but also extends the definition of personal data and allows for statutory damages in class action lawsuits when security breaches occur due to negligent data handling. For registrars operating globally, this creates a legal minefield, as they must comply with multiple, sometimes conflicting, breach notification requirements based on the location of their customers and servers.
Yet legal compliance alone is not sufficient. Best practices for breach disclosure must go beyond mere checkbox notification. Transparency, speed, and specificity are essential to mitigating harm. Affected customers need to know what data was compromised, how the breach occurred, what steps the registrar is taking to address the issue, and what they can do to protect themselves. Unfortunately, many registrars have been slow or vague in their disclosures, issuing generic statements that downplay the severity of breaches or delay notifications while internal investigations drag on. This not only erodes customer trust but also allows threat actors more time to exploit stolen data.
The gold standard for breach disclosure involves proactive communication, layered messaging for both technical and non-technical audiences, and a clear incident response roadmap. Immediately upon detection of a breach, registrars should isolate affected systems, preserve forensic evidence, and engage external cybersecurity experts. Within the initial hours, customers should receive alerts through multiple channels—email, dashboards, and social media—with actionable guidance such as changing passwords, reviewing DNS settings, and enabling two-factor authentication. Where financial data is involved, registrars should coordinate with banks and payment processors to monitor for fraud and offer credit monitoring services to affected individuals. Public disclosures should be updated regularly as the investigation progresses, with final reports made accessible to the broader community.
Beyond response, registrars must adopt preventative measures to reduce the likelihood and impact of breaches. This includes implementing end-to-end encryption for stored and transmitted data, enforcing strict access controls on administrative tools, regular penetration testing, and maintaining detailed audit logs. Multi-factor authentication should be mandatory for all registrar accounts, particularly those with access to domain configuration and DNS management. Security patches must be applied promptly, and staff should be trained in phishing awareness and incident response protocols. Additionally, registrars should engage in collaborative threat intelligence sharing with other industry actors, including CERTs and ICANN-accredited security forums, to stay ahead of emerging attack vectors.
Accountability mechanisms also need strengthening. ICANN, as the accrediting body for registrars, should consider incorporating minimum security standards into its Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA). Currently, the RAA includes basic operational and data retention obligations, but it does not mandate specific security protocols or incident response frameworks. By setting baseline requirements for encryption, access control, and breach notification procedures, ICANN could raise the security bar across the registrar ecosystem. Registrars that fail to meet these standards should be subject to compliance reviews, public reporting, or, in severe cases, loss of accreditation.
The role of transparency extends beyond immediate disclosure. After a breach, registrars should publish comprehensive post-mortem reports detailing the root cause, remediation steps taken, and lessons learned. This not only fosters trust with customers but also contributes to a culture of continuous improvement across the industry. Too often, breach disclosures are shrouded in PR language and legal defensiveness, depriving the public and peers of valuable insights into systemic vulnerabilities. A mature and resilient DNS environment depends on shared learning and open acknowledgment of mistakes.
Ultimately, registrars serve as custodians of digital identity and infrastructure. Their security posture affects not just individual domain holders, but the broader stability and trustworthiness of the internet. Data breaches at this level are not merely privacy violations—they are potential vectors for widespread cyberattacks, including phishing, ransomware, and state-sponsored espionage. The ethical and operational imperative to protect customer data must be matched by concrete action, robust regulation, and an unwavering commitment to transparency. Anything less risks compromising the foundations of the domain name system itself.
As gatekeepers of domain name ownership, registrars play a crucial role in the security and stability of the internet. These entities are entrusted with sensitive customer data, including domain ownership records, payment information, account credentials, and DNS settings that underpin the operational integrity of websites. A compromise at the registrar level does not just expose…