Community-Driven Efforts to Secure Routing building a safer internet through collaboration

The internet’s decentralized nature, while enabling global connectivity, also creates significant challenges in securing its routing infrastructure. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which facilitates the exchange of routing information between autonomous systems (ASes), was not designed with robust security features. This lack of inherent safeguards makes BGP vulnerable to issues such as route hijacking, route leaks, and prefix squatting, all of which can disrupt connectivity and compromise data integrity. In response to these vulnerabilities, community-driven efforts have emerged as a vital force in securing routing, leveraging collaboration, shared standards, and cooperative action to improve the stability and trustworthiness of the global internet.

One of the most prominent community-driven initiatives for securing routing is the Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS). MANRS is a global collaborative effort led by the Internet Society, providing a framework of best practices to improve routing security. Participants, including network operators, content delivery networks (CDNs), and internet exchange points (IXPs), commit to implementing measures such as filtering, anti-spoofing, coordination, and global validation. By adhering to these practices, MANRS participants reduce the risk of routing incidents and contribute to a more resilient internet. For example, filtering ensures that networks only advertise valid routes, preventing the propagation of unauthorized or incorrect prefixes. This action alone has a significant impact in mitigating route leaks and hijacks.

Another critical component of community-driven routing security is the adoption of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). RPKI is a cryptographic framework that enables route origin validation by associating IP address blocks with their rightful autonomous systems. Through the creation of Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), network operators can specify which ASes are authorized to originate specific prefixes. This information is then used by other networks to validate BGP announcements, rejecting routes that fail to match the ROAs. Community efforts have been instrumental in promoting RPKI adoption, with organizations like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) providing tools, training, and support to help networks implement this technology.

Internet exchange points also play a pivotal role in securing routing through community collaboration. IXPs, as hubs of interconnection, bring together a diverse array of networks and provide a platform for sharing best practices. Many IXPs actively promote routing security by offering RPKI validation services, route filtering policies, and training programs for their members. For instance, an IXP might deploy route servers that automatically validate BGP announcements against RPKI data, ensuring that only authenticated routes are propagated. This approach simplifies compliance with routing security standards and raises the baseline of security across the networks connected to the IXP.

Collaborative platforms such as PeeringDB and IRR (Internet Route Registry) databases are also central to community-driven routing security. PeeringDB provides a public repository of information about networks, including their peering policies, traffic volumes, and contact details. By fostering transparency and communication, PeeringDB helps network operators identify and mitigate routing anomalies, such as misconfigured or unauthorized routes. Similarly, IRRs allow networks to publish their routing policies and prefix ownership, enabling others to validate and filter BGP announcements effectively. Community efforts to improve the accuracy and reliability of IRR data have been ongoing, as outdated or incorrect entries can undermine their utility.

Education and awareness are foundational elements of community-driven routing security. Collaborative initiatives, such as the Network Operator Groups (NOGs) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), provide forums for knowledge sharing, technical training, and the development of standards. For example, NOG meetings often include workshops on RPKI deployment, route filtering, and incident response, equipping network engineers with the skills needed to implement secure practices. The IETF, through its Routing Security Working Group, develops technical standards and best practices, such as BGP path validation mechanisms and updates to routing protocol specifications. These efforts ensure that the internet community has access to the tools and knowledge required to address evolving threats.

Community-driven efforts also play a critical role in incident response and mitigation. When routing incidents occur, such as a large-scale route hijack or DDoS attack, the collaborative nature of the internet community enables rapid detection and resolution. Organizations such as the Network Security Groups (NSGs) and the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) facilitate communication and coordination among network operators, helping to identify the source of the issue and implement countermeasures. For instance, a network experiencing a BGP hijack might alert its peers and transit providers, who can then apply filters or update their routing policies to block the malicious routes.

The success of community-driven routing security depends on broad participation and commitment from all stakeholders in the internet ecosystem. Governments, private sector companies, academic institutions, and individual operators all have roles to play in fostering a secure and stable internet. Public-private partnerships, such as those between ISPs and regulatory bodies, can amplify the impact of community initiatives by providing resources, policy support, and enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, global organizations like the Internet Society and ICANN serve as catalysts for collaboration, bringing together diverse stakeholders to address common challenges.

Despite significant progress, challenges remain in achieving universal adoption of routing security measures. The decentralized nature of the internet means that participation in community-driven efforts is voluntary, and not all networks prioritize security to the same extent. Additionally, technical and economic barriers can impede implementation, particularly for smaller operators with limited resources. Addressing these challenges requires continued advocacy, education, and innovation to make routing security accessible and practical for all networks.

In conclusion, community-driven efforts to secure routing are a testament to the power of collaboration in addressing complex, global challenges. Initiatives like MANRS, RPKI, and IXP-led programs have made significant strides in improving routing security, reducing the risk of incidents that threaten the stability of the internet. By fostering transparency, education, and coordination, the internet community has built a foundation for a safer and more resilient global network. As threats continue to evolve, sustained participation and commitment from all stakeholders will be essential to maintaining the security and integrity of the internet’s routing infrastructure.

The internet’s decentralized nature, while enabling global connectivity, also creates significant challenges in securing its routing infrastructure. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which facilitates the exchange of routing information between autonomous systems (ASes), was not designed with robust security features. This lack of inherent safeguards makes BGP vulnerable to issues such as route hijacking, route…