Locking Down Access: How to Conduct an Internal Audit of Domain Permissions

Conducting an internal audit of domain permissions is one of the most critical and overlooked components of a sound cybersecurity strategy. Domain names are the gateway to all digital operations—websites, applications, email, APIs, and user authentication mechanisms. If a malicious actor gains control over a domain, they can reroute web traffic, intercept emails, impersonate legitimate services, and ultimately bring business to a halt. What makes this threat especially dangerous is that it often begins with an over-permissioned or mismanaged internal user account. Whether through employee negligence, poor access control policies, or outdated role assignments, the internal structure of who has access to domain management functions plays a key role in determining how secure the organization’s digital presence really is. An internal audit of domain permissions is not just about reducing risk—it’s about restoring and reinforcing visibility and control over one of your most essential assets.

The first step in auditing domain permissions is establishing a complete inventory of domain assets and registrar accounts. This may seem straightforward, but in large or decentralized organizations, domains are often registered by multiple departments over time—marketing, IT, product development, or even individual executives or contractors. These registrations might be under different registrars, use varied email addresses, or be associated with expired payment methods or dormant accounts. Bringing all domain names under a centralized visibility framework is the only way to ensure consistent and secure permission governance. This includes listing the registrar, the WHOIS contact emails, DNS providers, associated subdomains, linked hosting services, and the administrator account credentials for each asset.

Once the domain inventory is assembled, the next phase involves identifying all users who currently have access to domain registrar accounts, DNS hosting platforms, and related services such as SSL certificate management or email configuration panels. This includes both direct account holders and any delegated users who may have partial access. Each user’s level of access should be clearly defined—whether they can view, edit, or transfer domains, whether they can alter DNS records or enable domain locking features, and whether they are able to update billing information or change administrative contacts. This step should include both internal employees and external entities such as contractors, vendors, or agencies who have ever been granted access to assist with domain-related projects.

During the audit, special attention must be paid to role assignments and privilege levels. A common security flaw in domain management is the excessive assignment of administrative-level privileges to users who only require basic functionality. For instance, a content manager responsible for updating website copy should not have the ability to unlock the domain or generate an EPP code for transfer. Similarly, a freelance developer hired to configure a DNS entry for a short-term project should not retain access to the DNS provider long after their engagement has ended. Each user’s access should be evaluated based on the principle of least privilege—ensuring that they have only the permissions necessary to perform their specific tasks, and nothing more.

Audit logs and account activity records are also essential components of the evaluation. Most modern registrars and DNS providers offer logs of user activity that detail when changes were made, by whom, and from which IP address. These logs should be reviewed for anomalous patterns, such as failed login attempts, changes made during unusual hours, access from foreign IPs, or configuration updates that were not documented in internal workflows. Discrepancies or unexplained changes may point to policy violations, compromised credentials, or insider threats. Logging should not only be reviewed during the audit but enabled and monitored continuously thereafter.

Part of the internal audit should involve verifying authentication mechanisms. All users with domain access should be required to use strong, unique passwords and multi-factor authentication (MFA). If the registrar supports hardware-based authentication tokens, those should be prioritized over SMS or app-based MFA for high-privilege accounts. The audit should also evaluate how MFA reset requests are handled—whether by email, help desk, or direct contact—and determine if the process could be exploited by social engineering or insider manipulation. Insecure recovery mechanisms represent one of the weakest points in registrar account security and should be tightly controlled.

Another important consideration is access continuity and succession planning. The audit should verify that domain access is not tied to a single individual’s email or personal account, particularly in executive roles. If a key administrator leaves the organization, falls ill, or becomes otherwise unreachable, a failure to have shared or alternate access mechanisms in place can paralyze recovery efforts. Critical domain credentials should be stored in encrypted password vaults accessible to multiple authorized personnel, with audit trails in place for access. The audit should include simulation scenarios for how domain control would be restored in the event of sudden personnel loss, credential compromise, or system outages.

After mapping access and evaluating controls, the audit should result in immediate and corrective actions. Access for unnecessary users should be revoked, privilege levels should be reduced where applicable, MFA should be enforced across all accounts, and registrar settings such as domain locks, registrar locks, and DNSSEC should be confirmed as active. The audit process should also produce documentation that becomes part of the organization’s formal security policy—outlining roles, responsibilities, and access request procedures for any future domain management changes. Periodic re-audits should be scheduled at least quarterly or in conjunction with staffing changes, major product launches, or transitions between registrars.

Ultimately, a domain permissions audit is not just about identifying who has access—it is about determining whether your organization is in control. The exercise reveals not only potential vulnerabilities but also the health of your governance practices and your readiness to respond to incidents. In an environment where domain hijacking is a common, lucrative, and often silent threat, having unknown or unmonitored access to registrar and DNS tools is equivalent to leaving a vault unlocked in a crowded city. A rigorous, structured audit transforms domain management from an IT footnote into a cornerstone of digital security. It ensures that the right people have access for the right reasons, that every change can be accounted for, and that your domain—your digital identity—is protected from both internal mishaps and external threats.

Conducting an internal audit of domain permissions is one of the most critical and overlooked components of a sound cybersecurity strategy. Domain names are the gateway to all digital operations—websites, applications, email, APIs, and user authentication mechanisms. If a malicious actor gains control over a domain, they can reroute web traffic, intercept emails, impersonate legitimate…