Forking the Internet The Collision Risks Between ICANN Roots and Emerging Alt-Roots

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a foundational element of the internet’s architecture, translating human-readable domain names into IP addresses that computers use to communicate. At the top of this hierarchy sits the DNS root zone, managed under the auspices of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which coordinates the allocation of top-level domains (TLDs) such as .com, .org, and newer entries like .bank or .xyz. For decades, ICANN’s root has served as the global source of truth for domain resolution. But recent years have seen the emergence of alternative root systems—or “alt-roots”—such as Handshake, Namecoin, and Emercoin, which operate outside of ICANN’s authority. These alt-roots present a fundamental challenge to the stability, security, and universality of the internet by raising the risk of DNS namespace collisions—instances where the same TLD string is used in both ICANN and an alt-root system but points to different resources.

The concept of alt-roots is not new. As far back as the 1990s, experiments with non-ICANN roots were proposed as a response to what some viewed as centralized, bureaucratic, or politically influenced control of the internet’s naming system. However, such efforts remained largely fringe due to limited compatibility with mainstream browsers and resolvers. The advent of decentralized technologies and blockchain systems has revived interest in alt-roots with a more ideologically driven rationale. Projects like Handshake aim to create a decentralized and censorship-resistant root zone where ownership of TLDs is managed through cryptographic keys and distributed consensus rather than a central authority. Handshake’s proponents argue that this approach democratizes internet governance, reduces state and corporate capture, and increases resilience against takedown or seizure.

Yet the parallel operation of these systems introduces a core technical and operational problem: namespace collision. ICANN’s root assumes a global singularity—any given TLD is globally unique and consistently resolves across all devices. When alt-roots introduce TLDs that are not coordinated with ICANN’s root, conflicts can occur. For example, a domain such as .lib might be registered under Handshake and resolve to a server operated by an independent developer community. If ICANN later delegates .lib as an official TLD—perhaps to a library consortium or corporate sponsor—the same string could resolve differently depending on the DNS resolver configuration of the end user. This undermines the assumption of a consistent namespace and leads to a “split-brain” condition, where the internet appears differently to users depending on which root system they are querying.

The practical consequences of such collisions range from user confusion to serious cybersecurity concerns. If users rely on a browser plugin or alternative resolver that accesses Handshake domains, they may visit one version of a website under a given TLD, while users with conventional DNS settings see another. This creates opportunities for phishing, impersonation, or disinformation, especially if an attacker anticipates an eventual ICANN delegation and preemptively registers a conflicting alt-root domain. Moreover, developers building on one root may unknowingly deploy services that overlap or clash with another, creating interoperability breakdowns that degrade user trust and functionality.

ICANN itself has recognized the risk of name collisions in more limited contexts. During the 2012 new gTLD expansion, internal studies identified several applied-for TLDs that overlapped with internal corporate network domains (e.g., .corp, .home, .mail), prompting ICANN to defer their delegation to avoid unintended consequences. The organization has not, however, established a formal mechanism for detecting or reconciling conflicts with blockchain-based alt-roots. In part, this is due to the lack of institutional dialogue between ICANN and the communities developing alt-root technologies, many of whom reject ICANN’s legitimacy or approach to governance.

Handshake, for its part, has attempted to mitigate collision risk through proactive measures. The project preemptively reserved all existing ICANN TLDs and well-known internal-use strings (such as .localhost and .onion) to prevent their reallocation in the alt-root zone. Additionally, Handshake has made efforts to encourage holders of ICANN-recognized TLDs to claim their corresponding Handshake entries, offering cryptographic ownership of these names as a form of soft-compatibility. But these mitigations are imperfect. There is no binding agreement preventing ICANN from creating a TLD already registered in an alt-root system, nor any obligation for ICANN to coordinate with these networks when planning future delegations.

The collision risk is further complicated by growing user interest and emerging integrations. Some browsers, like Brave and Opera, have signaled openness to supporting alt-root domains, and DNS resolver services like NextDNS and Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 have explored compatibility experiments. If browser vendors begin enabling resolution of alt-root domains at scale, collisions will move from theoretical to actual. The risk then becomes not just one of technical ambiguity but of fragmenting the global internet itself into walled-off naming systems, each with their own roots, policies, and trust hierarchies.

This fragmentation undermines one of the core principles of the internet: universality. The promise that a domain entered into a browser will yield the same destination, no matter the country, ISP, or device, is essential for commerce, security, and interoperability. Once multiple naming systems compete for authority without coordination, the internet risks devolving into a patchwork of competing networks—not unlike incompatible phone systems or nationalized intranets. This scenario could lead to geopolitical fragmentation, where countries or political blocs endorse different root systems in line with their sovereignty goals, mirroring trends in internet governance that are already moving toward digital sovereignty and data localization.

Addressing the collision problem will require a mix of technical and institutional responses. One approach could be to establish a neutral, cross-system collision registry—a shared ledger where new TLDs in both ICANN and alt-roots are checked for conflicts and flagged accordingly. Alternatively, ICANN could adopt a policy that considers alt-root usage as a factor in evaluating new TLD applications, though this would challenge its historical reluctance to recognize non-sanctioned roots. On the alt-root side, projects like Handshake could adopt more dynamic reservation systems that reflect ICANN’s evolving root, or formalize channels for coexistence through voluntary standardization bodies like the IETF.

Ultimately, the risk of root collision is not merely a technical curiosity—it is a test of the internet’s governance model. Can a system built on global consensus accommodate competing visions of authority? Can decentralization coexist with universality? These questions cut to the heart of the internet’s identity as a shared public infrastructure. Ignoring them risks sleepwalking into a future where digital naming is no longer a common language but a battleground of rival protocols. Preventing that outcome will require openness, coordination, and a renewed commitment to ensuring that the world wide web remains truly worldwide.

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a foundational element of the internet’s architecture, translating human-readable domain names into IP addresses that computers use to communicate. At the top of this hierarchy sits the DNS root zone, managed under the auspices of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which coordinates the allocation of…