Government Advisory Committee Power Plays in New gTLD Rounds

The expansion of the domain name system through the introduction of new generic top-level domains has been one of the most transformative and controversial initiatives in the history of internet governance. While the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) sought to frame the process as a market-driven, multi-stakeholder endeavor aimed at increasing competition, choice, and innovation, the reality was far more complex. Central to this complexity was the role of the Governmental Advisory Committee, or GAC, the body within ICANN that represents the interests of national governments. Though formally advisory, the GAC has wielded significant influence over new gTLD rounds, leveraging its collective voice to shape outcomes, block applications, and impose restrictions. The resulting dynamic reveals not only the delicate balance of power within ICANN’s multi-stakeholder model but also the broader struggle between state sovereignty and the idea of a borderless internet.

The GAC’s authority arises from its ability to provide “advice” to the ICANN Board on matters of public policy, particularly where national laws and concerns intersect with the domain name system. While ICANN is not formally bound to accept this advice, the bylaws state that the Board must take it into account and, if it chooses to reject it, must enter into a process of consultation with the GAC to seek resolution. This structure effectively elevates the GAC’s recommendations to a privileged status, as ignoring them risks political confrontation with powerful governments. During the first new gTLD round in 2012, this influence became unmistakably clear, as the GAC issued a series of interventions that reshaped the program in profound ways.

One of the most visible power plays came in the form of “early warnings.” Governments used this mechanism to flag applications they considered problematic, often citing concerns over public interest, national sensitivities, or potential misuse. For instance, Australia issued warnings against a range of generic applications, arguing that some terms should not be monopolized by private entities. Other governments objected to applications for religious terms, geographic names, or words with cultural significance. These early warnings, though not binding, signaled to applicants and to ICANN that pursuing the applications in question could provoke political opposition and potential rejection. In effect, they served as a tool for governments to exert soft power over the process, guiding it toward outcomes aligned with their own policy priorities.

The GAC’s most dramatic intervention came in the form of “consensus advice” issued at the Beijing meeting in 2013. In this advice, the GAC formally objected to certain applications, recommending outright rejection of some and imposing broad safeguards on categories of others. Entire groups of proposed gTLDs, such as those related to sensitive strings like .health, .doctor, or .bank, were singled out for additional restrictions. The GAC argued that these strings carried public interest implications that required enhanced consumer protections, stricter vetting of registrants, and in some cases outright exclusion of certain applicants. ICANN, wary of defying such coordinated advice, largely incorporated these recommendations into the implementation process. For applicants, this meant sudden changes in requirements, new compliance obligations, and in some cases the collapse of their business models. The episode highlighted how governments could, through the GAC, reshape the economic and operational landscape of the new gTLD market.

National sovereignty concerns also played a central role in GAC interventions. Governments were particularly sensitive to applications involving geographic names or terms associated with national identity. Applications for strings like .amazon, .patagonia, and .africa sparked intense disputes. In the case of .amazon, South American governments argued that the name was not merely a corporate brand but a geographic and cultural identifier tied to the Amazon region. The GAC issued advice against granting the string to Amazon, the company, despite its established trademark rights. This led to years of contention, with the ICANN Board ultimately deferring to the GAC’s position, demonstrating the decisive power governments could wield when presenting a united front. Similarly, .africa became a flashpoint when competing applications were evaluated, with the African Union asserting its authority over the name and using the GAC as a vehicle to enforce its stance. These cases underscored how governments viewed the DNS not simply as a technical resource but as a symbolic extension of national and regional sovereignty.

The GAC’s interventions also illuminated the tension between global governance and domestic politics. Governments often brought their national regulatory frameworks into the ICANN arena, seeking to project domestic policy preferences onto the global stage. For example, concerns about consumer protection, data privacy, and intellectual property enforcement were repeatedly raised by European governments, reflecting their domestic policy priorities. By contrast, other governments emphasized cultural sensitivities, morality, or national security concerns. This diversity of perspectives sometimes clashed, but when consensus was achieved, it carried extraordinary weight. The ability of governments to use the GAC to export domestic policy concerns into global internet governance represented a profound reassertion of state authority in what had been designed as a multi-stakeholder model.

For the private sector, the unpredictability of GAC interventions created significant uncertainty. Applicants who had invested millions of dollars in pursuing new gTLDs often found their prospects derailed by political objections raised late in the process. Some critics argued that the GAC’s role created a parallel evaluation track that undermined the formal application procedures managed by ICANN’s independent panels. Instead of relying solely on technical, financial, and policy criteria outlined at the start of the process, applicants had to anticipate and navigate a shifting landscape of government concerns, many of which were articulated only after applications had been submitted. This not only increased costs but also introduced an element of political risk that was difficult to mitigate.

The GAC’s growing assertiveness also raised questions about the legitimacy of ICANN’s multi-stakeholder model. Civil society groups and some industry stakeholders argued that giving governments such disproportionate influence undermined the balance of voices that the model was supposed to ensure. The concern was that ICANN risked becoming a venue for intergovernmental bargaining, dominated by the same dynamics that pervade international organizations like the United Nations. Defenders of the GAC’s role, however, countered that governments have unique responsibilities to protect citizens and ensure the public interest, making their input indispensable. This tension remains unresolved, and the debate continues to shape how future gTLD rounds will be structured.

Looking ahead, the influence of the GAC is likely to be even more pronounced in subsequent gTLD rounds. Governments have learned from the first round how to use the tools available to them—early warnings, consensus advice, and formal objections—to shape outcomes. They are also increasingly attuned to the geopolitical significance of the DNS. In an era of growing internet fragmentation, with states asserting digital sovereignty and geopolitical blocs pursuing divergent regulatory approaches, the GAC has become an arena where these battles are played out. Whether it is disputes over geographic names, cultural sensitivities, or strings associated with critical infrastructure, governments are unlikely to retreat from asserting their interests.

The story of GAC power plays in new gTLD rounds is thus a story of the reassertion of state authority in global internet governance. While ICANN sought to open the domain name system to market competition and entrepreneurial innovation, governments used the GAC to ensure that their policy, cultural, and sovereignty concerns were not sidelined. The result has been a more politicized, less predictable, and more contested process than many envisioned at the outset. For all stakeholders, from applicants to policymakers to end users, the lesson is clear: the DNS cannot be insulated from geopolitics, and any future expansion of the namespace will be shaped as much by power plays in the GAC as by technical or commercial considerations. In the balance between the multi-stakeholder ideal and the realities of state power, the GAC has shown that governments remain indispensable—and in many cases decisive—actors in the governance of the global internet.

The expansion of the domain name system through the introduction of new generic top-level domains has been one of the most transformative and controversial initiatives in the history of internet governance. While the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) sought to frame the process as a market-driven, multi-stakeholder endeavor aimed at increasing competition,…