Privacy in Web3 Naming: Reverse Resolution and Metadata Exposure

As Web3 naming systems gain traction and increasingly become the identity layer for decentralized applications, the question of privacy takes center stage. Unlike traditional domain systems, where registrant data is typically stored in centralized WHOIS databases and can be obfuscated through privacy services, Web3 domains operate on public blockchains where all transactions and contract interactions are visible by design. This transparency, while foundational to trustlessness and verifiability, poses significant challenges for privacy, particularly when it comes to reverse resolution and metadata exposure.

Reverse resolution is a feature that allows a blockchain address to be associated with a human-readable name. In Ethereum Name Service (ENS), for instance, a user can set a reverse record so that their wallet address displays as alice.eth in compatible interfaces like wallets or block explorers. While this improves usability and human legibility, it also introduces a direct link between a pseudonymous wallet and a persistent identity. Once a reverse record is set, any interaction that wallet engages in—whether it be trading tokens, voting in a DAO, minting NFTs, or sending messages—is effectively tagged with that name. The address becomes searchable and indexable, creating an aggregated behavioral profile over time. This erodes pseudonymity and can open users up to tracking, profiling, and even targeting, particularly in cases where the domain hints at a real-world identity.

The issue compounds when metadata is added to a Web3 domain. Many naming systems allow domain owners to attach text records such as email addresses, social media handles, website URLs, and avatar hashes. These records are often stored on-chain or in decentralized storage systems like IPFS, and while they can enhance user discovery and utility, they also contribute to identity leakage. Even seemingly innocuous metadata can be triangulated to identify a user. For example, a Twitter handle in a text record, when combined with a transaction history, can reveal associations between online personas and financial behavior. Given the permanent and public nature of blockchain records, once this data is exposed, it cannot be retracted, unlike in traditional systems where a record can be redacted or deleted by a registrar.

The problem is not just about voluntary disclosure. Many dApps and third-party services actively scrape and index Web3 domain data, creating extensive databases that link domain names to wallet addresses, transaction patterns, and social connections. These aggregations are often exposed through APIs or dashboards that offer convenience at the cost of user privacy. In some cases, reverse resolution is automatically performed without user consent, meaning that simply interacting with a platform while logged into a wallet can reveal the associated domain name. This passive surveillance dynamic is antithetical to the privacy-preserving ethos of decentralization and places the burden on users to be aware of the risks.

Mitigating these exposures requires both technical and behavioral interventions. From a technical standpoint, naming protocols could support opt-in privacy features such as encrypted text records, zero-knowledge proofs for ownership verification, or ephemeral reverse records that expire after a defined period. Wallets and interfaces could be designed to prompt users before broadcasting domain-linked identities, and dApps could implement policies that respect user preferences regarding name resolution. On the behavioral side, users must be conscious of the trade-offs between convenience and privacy. Choosing not to set a reverse record, avoiding the inclusion of personally identifying metadata, and using multiple wallet addresses for different purposes are strategies that can help preserve pseudonymity in a public ledger environment.

However, these practices are not always accessible or intuitive to the average user. Many onboarding flows actively encourage linking a domain to a wallet for branding, reputation, or community recognition. The cultural emphasis on personalization—complete with ENS avatars, profile badges, and public bios—can unintentionally incentivize over-disclosure. Moreover, the value of a domain as a digital identity asset may depend on its discoverability, creating a tension between visibility and privacy that has no easy resolution.

Ultimately, the architecture of Web3 naming is still evolving, and so too are the norms around identity, transparency, and data protection. The current trajectory privileges permanence and openness, but this must be balanced against the human need for control over personal information. As decentralized identity systems mature, privacy must be designed not as an afterthought but as a core feature. This means building tools that give users granular control over what is shared, when, and with whom—and doing so in a way that aligns with the principles of decentralization. In the context of Web3 naming, achieving privacy without sacrificing utility will be one of the defining challenges of the coming era.

As Web3 naming systems gain traction and increasingly become the identity layer for decentralized applications, the question of privacy takes center stage. Unlike traditional domain systems, where registrant data is typically stored in centralized WHOIS databases and can be obfuscated through privacy services, Web3 domains operate on public blockchains where all transactions and contract interactions…